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 Abstract 
Tournaments are designed to enhance participants’ effort and productivity. However, ranking near the 
top may increase psychological pressure and reduce performance. We empirically study the impact of 
interim rank on performance using data from international diving tournaments. We find that 
competitors systematically underperform when ranked closer to the top, despite higher incentives to 
perform well. 
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1. Introduction
It is common for workers to compete in tournaments for rewards based on relative 
performance. A growing literature has emerged on the effects of tournaments on labor market 
outcomes. While competition may lead to enhanced performance, some studies suggest that 
the incentives provided by tournaments may also increase psychological pressure, ultimately 
diminishing performance (Ariely et al 2005; Dohmen, 2008; Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta 
2009, Genakos and Pagliero 2012). 
In this paper, we focus on how interim ranking in a dynamic tournament affects 
performance. We start with the observation that performance pressure on those leading the 
competition is likely different from the pressure on those lagging behind. We then focus on 
how performance varies depending on interim ranking, while holding constant the type of 
task being performed. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, it exploits a unique 
feature of diving competitions: an athlete’s entire dive list is announced before the 
competition begins.
5
 No changes are allowed. Thus, the full list of movements to be
performed within each competition is completely predetermined. Relative to Genakos and 
Pagliero (2012), this feature greatly simplifies the analysis of the impact of interim rank on 
performance, since athletes’ strategies cannot respond to events during the competition. 
Second, this paper provides an interesting test of the external validity of previous results 
regarding the effect of rank on performance obtained using data on weightlifting competitions 
(Genakos and Pagliero 2012). In fact, although the skill sets required by competitive diving 
and weightlifting are completely different (agility vs. strength), we still find consistent 
evidence that professional divers, like weightlifters, underperform when close to the top of 
5 Each dive is identified by an alphanumeric code and its degree of difficulty. Athletes must perform the exact movements 
required for the announced dives. 
3 
the interim ranking. This result is robust to additional controls for fatigue, intensity of the 
competition or the potential gain in rank from a well-executed dive. 
2. Diving competitions and the data
In diving, athletes jump into the water from a platform or springboard while performing 
acrobatics. Athletes are divided by gender, and most competitions consist of three disciplines: 
1m and 3m springboards, and the platform (10m). In major events, there is a preliminary and 
a semi-final stage. The best athletes then compete in the finals. 
Divers submit a list of dives they intend to perform before the event.
6
 Each dive has a
fixed degree of difficulty, depending on what combination of twists, tucks, pikes and 
somersaults it involves. During the competition, the athletes perform their list of dives in 
sequence and a panel of judges awards them a score for each dive.
7
 An interim score is
calculated after each attempt based on the cumulative score of dives taken so far. The diver 
with the highest total score at the end of the competition is declared the winner. 
The relationship between final rank and prizes is convex, although it is not precisely 
observable to the researcher. Direct monetary prizes for diving are smaller than for more 
popular sports like tennis and golf. However, indirect rewards such as media coverage, 
private sponsorships, and other benefits such as civil service jobs are often enjoyed by 
athletes winning medals in international competitions. 
We collected round-by-round data from the international governing body of aquatic sports 
(FINA) for all divers participating in the finals of Olympic Games, World and European 
Championships, and Champions Cup from 1988 to 2012, yielding over 7,500 individual 
stage-specific observations for 515 athletes. For each observation we know the type of 
competition, date, athlete’s name, discipline, the degree of difficulty and score achieved for 
6 The number of dives in the finals has varied over the years (between 5 and 11). 
7 Each of seven judges awards from 0 to 10 points for every dive. The final score for each dive is calculated by deleting the 
two highest and two lowest scores and summing the remaining scores. 
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each dive, together with the final overall ranking of each competition. From this, we 
reconstructed the interim ranking of all athletes at each stage of the competition. 
3. Empirical Framework
We estimate the impact of interim rank on performance using the following model: 
	 =  + (	),  +  !"	 + # + 	 (1) 
where Scoreitjs is the score obtained by athlete i, in year t, competition j, and stage s.
8
Difficultyitjs is the degree of difficulty, and Rankitj(s-1) is the interim rank in the previous stage. 
Our main interest is in the vector of parameters δ1 in the flexible functional form g(·), which 
describes the impact of rank on the score achieved, controlling for the degree of difficulty. 
We correct for unobserved heterogeneity by extensively controlling for fixed effects. In 
particular, the error term in (1) can be decomposed as: 
	 = # + # + # + # + # + # + # + $	 (2) 
where ηitjs describes the random component of performance, ηitjs~IID(0,ση
2
). This
idiosyncratic component allows for random errors by the athletes, or for unforeseen 
circumstances affecting performance during a specific dive. Our most general specification 
allows for athlete-year-competition fixed effects. 
4. Results
We explore the relationship between interim rank and the score for a dive using a fully 
flexible dummy-variable specification, g(Rankitj(s-1), δ1) = Σn δ1n Rank(n)itj(s-1). Table 1 reports 
the results using alternative fixed effects specifications. The omitted rank category 
8 In stage s, athletes must perform the sth dive in their list. The first stage is dropped because the interim ranking is not 
defined. 
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corresponds to the athlete ranked first, so all the rank coefficients measure the impact of 
being ranked n
th
 relative to being first. Figure 1 plots the estimated coefficients. 
Controlling for multiple sources of unobserved heterogeneity has a substantial impact on 
the results. There is no significant correlation between interim ranking and score when we 
control for athlete, year, and competition fixed effects separately (Table 1, columns 1 and 2). 
However, as we control for additional sources of unobserved heterogeneity, a positive and 
statistically significant relationship appears (Table 1, columns 3 and 5).
9
 The magnitude of
the impact is also substantial. The score of an individual dive varies between 0 and 30, and a 
shift from first to tenth place implies an increase in score of about 5 points, which is about 23 
percent of the mean score in the sample. 
Robustness 
Table 2, column 1 shows that interim rank has a positive and significant effect on 
performance. When we also control for fatigue using the cumulative degree of difficulty 
attempted in previous stages (column 2), the impact of rank is virtually unchanged. 
Subsequently, we control for the intensity of competition. We compute the number (Nitjs) of 
athletes k≠i with interim score sktjs within a 10 point radius: (sitjs-10)≤ sktjs < (sitjs+10). We 
then construct a binary indicator for close competitions, which is equal to one when more 
than 50 percent of the competitors are within the 10 point radius (Nitjs/N>0.5). The impact of 
interim rank remains positive. 
Finally, the potential gain in rank from executing a perfect dive may increase as ranking 
declines; this may lead athletes to exert greater effort, resulting in better performance. We 
compute for each observation the potential improvement in rank position deriving from a 
perfectly executed dive, given the observed performance of all the other competitors. 
Including this variable has no substantial impact on the effect of interim rank (column 4). 
9 This result is driven by omitted variable bias. Individuals with greater ability are likely to be ranked towards the top, and 
they also perform better on average. When we do not control for individual characteristics, the rank variable captures the 
impact of differences in quality, so the performance at the top of the ranking is overestimated. 
6 
7. Conclusions
Our analysis of diving competitions contributes to the existing literature by showing that 
“choking under pressure” does not depend on the type of task performed by competitors; nor 
does it depend on the timing of announcements or on whether the performance measure is 
discrete or continuous. Our findings on underperformance at the top also have important 
implications. For example, tournament organizers could withhold information about interim 
ranking during the competition or provide rough information about relative performance in 
order to increase the performance of the interim winners. 
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FIGURE 1: THE IMPACT OF INTERIM RANK ON PERFORMANCE 
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TABLE 1 - THE IMPACT OF INTERIM RANK ON PERFORMANCE IN DIVING 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Score itjs Score itjs Score itjs Score itjs Score itjs 
Degree of Difficultyitjs -3.899*** -3.904*** -3.930*** -4.102*** -4.103*** 
(0.237) (0.237) (0.240) (0.257) (0.232) 
Rank 2 0.087 0.102 0.330 0.408* 0.791*** 
(0.203) (0.204) (0.229) (0.231) (0.211) 
Rank 3 0.044 0.069 0.358 0.760*** 1.486*** 
(0.204) (0.209) (0.239) (0.270) (0.232) 
Rank 4 -0.229 -0.189 0.173 0.774** 1.742*** 
(0.219) (0.224) (0.262) (0.300) (0.254) 
Rank 5 -0.119 -0.066 0.431* 1.321*** 2.640*** 
(0.213) (0.214) (0.254) (0.322) (0.279) 
Rank 6 -0.468** -0.404* 0.333 1.550*** 3.200*** 
(0.234) (0.238) (0.293) (0.362) (0.283) 
Rank 7 -0.413 -0.336 0.519 1.803*** 3.580*** 
(0.304) (0.305) (0.366) (0.411) (0.338) 
Rank 8 -0.174 -0.098 0.803** 2.213*** 4.206*** 
(0.284) (0.288) (0.340) (0.416) (0.334) 
Rank 9 -0.313 -0.242 0.677* 2.352*** 4.532*** 
(0.320) (0.322) (0.392) (0.447) (0.374) 
Rank 10 -0.449 -0.377 0.777** 2.457*** 5.016*** 
(0.314) (0.316) (0.375) (0.451) (0.381) 
Rank 11 -0.198 -0.118 1.166*** 3.046*** 5.735*** 
(0.321) (0.326) (0.397) (0.461) (0.401) 
Rank 12 -0.032 0.052 1.739*** 3.737*** 6.900*** 
(0.350) (0.352) (0.449) (0.528) (0.440) 
Observations 7,507 7,507 7,507 7,507 7,507 
Clusters 515 515 515 515 515 
Athlete FE yes yes 
Competition FE yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
Competition-Year FE yes 
Athlete-Competition FE yes 
Athlete-Year FE yes 
Athlete-Year-Competition FE yes 
          
Notes: All equations include stage of the competition and discipline binary indicators. Standard errors clustered at the 
athlete level are reported in parentheses: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
9 
TABLE 2 - THE IMPACT OF INTERIM RANK ON PERFORMANCE IN DIVING - ROBUSTNESS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Score itjs Score itjs Score itjs Score itjs 
Degree of Difficultyitjs -4.105*** -4.113*** -4.044*** -2.616*** 
(0.232) (0.229) (0.234) (0.188) 
Rankitj(s-1) 0.574*** 0.572*** 0.573*** 0.389*** 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.025) 
Fatigue -0.226** 
Cumulative degree of difficulty attempted (0.094) 
Close Competition 0.498*** 
Dummy = 1 if competitors' density within 10 points radius is high (0.175) 
Potential Gains -1.153*** 
Number of gained ranks if perfect score (0.031) 
Observations 7,507 7,507 7,507 7,507 
Clusters 515 515 515 515 
Athlete-Year-Competition FE yes yes yes yes 
Notes: All equations include stage of the competition binary indicators. Standard errors clustered at the athlete level are reported in parentheses: *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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